Islamic Confcrcnce and thc Islamic Organizations of intcrnational charactcr and to realize co-opcration in thc service of the Islamic objeetives."
Fifty-onc Islamic member states constituting the OIC have different political and social struetures, population, size and per capita incomc. Consequently, they pursue different domcstic and foreign policics and do not have identical overall expectations from thc organization. They sharc, however, a common rcligion and -with the notable exception of Turkeysimilar historical past and traditions. They ali belong to thc catcgory of developing states of thc so-ealled Third World; and -again Turkey cxccptcdthey are ali non-aligned. Thus, despite thcir abovc-mcntioncd diffcrcnccs, they sharc samc vievvs and aspirations on varicty of intcrnational issues like colonialism, racial diserimination, disarmament and nevv intcrnational economic order. Rcsolulions adoptcd by thc Summit Confcrcnccs and Foreign Ministcrs' mcctings of thc OIC as vvcll as its charter are bascd on thc samc principlcs as those upheld by thc Confcrcncc of Non-Aligncd countrics.
Turkey has a uniquc place in thc OIC. 2 It is the only NATO member of the OIC. It is the only member of thc OIC that has not yet signcd its eharter on thc grounds that it contravcnes both the sccular Turkish constitution, vvhich established a clcar-cut separation of rcligious and tcmporal affairs, and Turkey's intcrnational status as a member of thc Western Community and NATO ally. Thcrcforc, Turkey is not a de jurc full member of thc OIC cventhough it is treated as such by thc members of thc Organization. Bccause of its sccular constitution Turkey does not participate in thc funelioning of certain principal and subsidiary organs of thc OIC that operate on thc principlcs of Islamic lavv (Shariat) i.e. International Islamic Court of Justicc and Islamic Fıqh (Islamic jurisprudcnce) Acadcmy.
With its grovving cconomy vviıh vvide potential and its political stability Turkey distinguishes itsclf as onc of thc influential members -like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan-of thc organization. It is onc of thc participant states at thc Rabat Confcrcnce of 1969, and serves, since 1984, as the Chairman of the Standing Committcc on Economic and Commercial Coopcration (COMCEC); onc of thc 6 spccializcd commitces thc mandate of vvhich involvcd "playing an eminent role in determining the policics and defining priorilies in vital fields such as cconomy, commcrcc..." 3 Polilically, 2 See "Türkiye'nin islam Konferansı İle ilişkileri" (Turkey's Relations vvith tlıe OIC) in islam Konferansı Örgütü (the Organization of the Islamic Conference) (An unpublishcd documcnt rclcased by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry), pp. 14-16. This papcr uses Cyprus issuc as an cxample to demonstrate Turkey's objeetives vis â vis thc OIC, spccifically, how Turkey has tricd to ulilize the OIC to sccure support for its Cyprus cause particularly sincc the proclamation of thc "Turkish Rcpublic of Northern Cyprus" in Novcmbcr 1983 up to the 1990s -Dcccmbcr 1992, to bc morc exact.-What vverc Turkey's aims in its relations vvith thc OIC on the Cyprus issuc? What methods did Turkey usc to influcncc thc members of OIC? Hovv successful vvas Turkey in achieving its aims? Thcse arc thc main questions that vvill be considcrcd in this analysis.
Turkey's OveralI Perspeetive On The Cyprus Issue, its Aims And Methods Utilized To Win The Support Of Islamic States And OIC Prior To The 1970s:
The cvolution of thc Cyprus conflict could bc considcrcd in follovving succcssivc stages: Prior to thc cstablishmcnt of the Rcpublic of Cyprus in 1960; from the collapsc of Zurich-London agrccmcnLs in 1963 to Turkey Christians and spoke Grcck, vvcrc lo bc thc co-foundcr partners of ıhc ncvv Rcpublic of Cyprus. They vvcrc to bc autonomous in thcir communal aflairs and vvcrc to parlake in ıhc ccniral govcrnmcnt on an agreed basis of 7:3., i.e., 7 Grcck Cypriot ministers versus 3 Turkish Cypriot ministers. Prcsidcnl of thc Rcpublic vvas to bc a Grcck Cypriol and Vicc-Prcsidcnt a Turkish Cypriot. The Grcck Cypriots, hovvcvcr, had never inicnded to support ıhis bicommunal struclurc of thc ncvv statc. They had considcrcd it as a Grcck statc and had not renounccd thcir agcs-old dream of thc union of thc island vvilh Grcccc, callcd Enosis. They dclibcralely started ıhc events of 1963 so thal Enosis could finally bc realized. Let alonc thc fact that Enosis had bccn prohibitcd by Ihc Zurich-London agrccmcnts along vvilh taksim -partition of thc island by Turkcy and Greecc-, il vvould havc bccn, vvhen realized, the slavery for thc Turkish Cypriot community vvho had not inlcrminglcd vvith thc Grcck Cypriot majority in any ficld and maintaincd its cullural and national herilage over ccnturics. Having bccn forccd out of ıhc govcrnmcnt by thc Grcck Cypriots at gunpoint, Ihc Turkish Cypriot minority vvcrc alrcady enduring various kinds of hardships at thc hands of thc Grcck Cypriot govcrnmcnt such as cconomic embargo, rcstrictions on ıhc freedom of movement of civilians, unavailability of somc csscntial public scrvice, suffering of rcfugccs and so on.
In the light of ali thcsc considcrations Turkish statesmen vvanicd thc vvorld community of stales to affirm that; thc Turkish Cypriots vvcrc cqual partners to thcir Grcck counterparıs; ıhaı they deserved ali kinds of support of thc vvorld community against thc Grcck Cypriot attempts to dominale them in violalion of thc Zurich-London agreements; and thal thc Zurich-London agrccmcnts granted Turkey -along vvilh Grcccc and Grcat Britain-the "obligalion" of intervention in Cyprus should thcıindcpcndcnce, territorial Sce intcgrity, sccurity and thc federal foundations of thc Rcpublic is endangered in any way. They wantcd thc vvorld community to understand that duc to its historical tics to the island -the Turkish Cypriot community was thc remnant of thc Ottoman Turkish rulc of thc island from 1571 to 1878-, and duc to the geographical proximity of the island to Turkey -stratcgically locatcd only 40 miles south of Turkey-, Turkey could not be expcctcd to remain indifferent to a drastic ehange that would occur in thc independent status of thc island under Enosis.
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In order to cnlist intcrnational support of these vicws Turkey initialcd a diplomatic campaign in thc Middlc East, Asia, Africa and Latin Amcrica in 1964. its dispatehed good will missions to these placcs; high level mcetings wcre arranged with thc lcadcrs of thc influcnıial Islamic statcs, like Pakistan and Iran; and Turkcy's rcprcscntatives wcrc sent to attend various NonAligncd and Islamic mcclings. In the coursc of this diplomatic campaign thc Turkish representatives closcly monitorcd thc "tactics" employed by the Grcck Cypriots in Non-Aligncd mcclings to gain intcrnational supporl for thcir position on Cyprus issuc, as wcll as ihc responsiveness of thc NonAligncd statcs to ihose taclics. These obscrvalions sccm to have suggcstcd to the Turks ıhal thc Non-Aligncd stalcs did not constilute a rigid bloc conccrning thcir individual approachcs to and pcrccptions of thc Cyprus issuc. Thercfore, they could bc persuaded to support Turkcy's Cyprus causc in intcrnational platforms most importantly in the UN, providcd that Turkey vvas willing to support thcir own causcs.
8 it was within this contcxt thc importancc of OIC as an inicrgovcrnmcntal organization, whose mcmbcr statcs constitutcs about onc third of thc UN and rcprcscntcd in thc NonAligncd Confcrcncc, incrcascd in thc eyes of the Turkish statcsmcıı över time. Turkcy's presence in thc OIC, whcrc Grcck Cypriots wcrc not represented, could bc uscd to inducc this organization to pass pro-Turkish Cypriot resolutions that vvould help Turkish causc on Cyprus gain intcrnational legilimacy. These resolutions could also bc of an important help in inducing thc support of thc Islamic countrics for Turkcy's Cyprus cause to countcr thc Grcck Cypriot propaganda offensive in intcrnational platforms, particularly in thc UN. 14 Thc istanbul Confcrcncc also agrccd that thc representatives of thc "Turkish Müslim Community of Cyprus" bc invitcd to attend l'uturc mcctings of thc OIC as a "gucst". Latcr, the Tcnth Islamic Confcrcncc of Forcign Ministcrs held in Fcz, Morocco, in May 1979, not only acccptcd thc ehange of this gucst status to that of "obscrvcr" but also callcd for the OIC members to support thc Turkish Cypriot community hurt by thc economic embargo imposed on il by thc Greck Cypriot lcadcrship of ıhc island. 15 General Sccrctariat of Ihc OIC, in its turn, appcarcd particularly helpful in coordinaling thc ovcrall support providcd by thc OIC to thc Turks' Cyprus causc. It submittcd thc dccisions of thc OIC confcrcncc on Cyprus issuc to thc UN there to bc ineluded in thc official documcnt and distributed to ali members of this organization. It also informcd thc Islamic Devclopmcnt Bank to providc aid for thc Turkish Cypriot community. According to the OIC documcnts, Islamic Solidarity Fund and ali organs of thc General Sccrctariat vvere providing assistancc for Turkish Cypriols; and contacts had been held bctvvccn thc representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
Turkish Perspective On The Proclanıation Of "Turkish Republic Of Northern Cyprus":
In thc words of thc Turkish Cypriot lcadcr Rauf Dcnktaş following factors contributcd to thcir proclaiming "Turkish Rcpublic of Northern Cyprus" on Novcmbcr 15, 1983. dcvcloped ties vvith the West and svviflly dcveloping relations with thc nonWcstcrn world. This time, howcvcr, givcn thc naturc of Cyprus issuc as a mattcr of national prcstigc and thc scnsitivity of Turkish public opinion to it they fclt that they had to go along wiıh this "fait accompli." 19 Turkey thus bccame the only state in the world vvhich rccognizcd thc Turkish state. It approved thc Turkish Cypriot lcadcrship's justificalions for and expcctations from proelaiming thc ncw state without any reservation and defended and soughl intcrnational support for them in intcrnational arena, most importantly in the UN. 20 In this respcct thc perceivcd imporlancc of thc OIC pressed itsel foncc morc.
A Nevv Momentum In Turkey's Relations Witlı The OIC In The 1980s:
From thc pcrspcctivc of Turkey's relations vvith thc OIC, 1980s could be considcrcd in two periods. Thc period of 1980-1983 savv thc importance of thc OIC in Turkish foreign policy grovv. This fact vvas largcly duc lo thc improvemcnl of Ihc Turkish cconomy that camc in thc vvakc of thc military intervention in Turkish politics on Scptembcr 12, 1980. This intervention broughl inlcrnal unity and slability inlo thc politically chaolic almosphere prevailing in Turkey, raising thc prcstigc of Turkey in thc OIC. Also, thc incrcase in Turkish exports, brought about by thc succcssful implcmentalion of thc cconomic rcsolution of January 1980, vvhich vvas bascd on domcstic produetion and cxport promotion, madc thc markets of thc Islamic countrics more important than ever for thc Turks.
In thc period of 1980-1983 Turkey took majör lcading initiatives in the OIC to contributc lo the promotion of cconomic coopcration among member states. It hosted, for cxamplc, a high-lcvcl Islamic meeting in Ankara in November 1980 vvhich drafted a common strategy for economic coopcration among thc Islamic countrics, callcd thc "Plan for Action. In the subsequent period beginning in 1984 and extending into the 1990s, relations between Turkey and thc OIC full-bloomcd. Thc fundamcntal intcrnational changcs brought about by thc post Cold-War are -most visibly thc collapsc of communist regimes beginning in Eastcrn Europc in 1989-offcred both advantages and disadvantages for Turkey in accomplishing its foreign policy objcctives, in general. On thc onc hand, thc emcrgcnce of fivc Turkic Rcpublics after the collapsc of thc Sovict Union in Dcccmbcr 1991 boosted Turkcy's morale and its intcrnational prestige in expcctation of its strengthening intcrnational posture in every field. On the other hand, hovvcvcr, rcccding communist glacicr from the Balkans, Eastcrn Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, left these arcas in aetual or potential turmoil and crcatcd dangerous challcngcs to rcgional and vvorld order in various ways, threalening Turkcy's national sccurity. In thc political, and morc spccifically sccurity realm the UN bccamc, in thc eyes of thc Turkish statesmen; the "fSecurityl umbrclla of encouraging it to deal with the rcgional conflicts upsetting world pcacc and by contributing to UN's enlorcement mcchanisms. 22 In thc cconomic realm, if rcgionalism wcrc to supplant and undermine globalism vvith Europc, North America and East Asia emerging as externally elosed trading blocks, locking out thc developing counlrics of Africa, Asia and thc Middle East -ineluding Turkey-thc OIC, vvith its cfforts tovvard securing free tradc among Islamic statcs could prove to bc onc of thc mcans of helping Turkcy's cconomic development, in vvhatever capacily.
Thc most visible sign of Turkcy's blooming relations vvith thc OICand also if its prestige in thc OIC-in this period vvas Turkey's assumption of thc chairmanship of thc Standing Committcc on Economic and Commcrcial Coopcralion (COMCEC) of thc OIC Chartcr. At thc level of political coopcration Turkey madc cfforts -cvcnthough vvith less cnıhusiasm and succcss as comparcd vvith its activity in thc cconomic realm-to contributc to thc coopcralion of Islamic counlrics in promoling rcgional sccurity in thc Middle East. It served, for cxamplc, in Islamic Pcacc Committee, set up by thc Third OIC Summit of January 1981 to bring about pcaccful ending of thc Iran-Irac] vvar. In thc post Cold vvar cra, Turkey channcllcd its activity in cconomic and political realms in thc OIC to get this organization aetively engaged in contributing to thc construction of "a nevv vvorld order" most notably in the Balkans, thc Caucasus and Central Asia. [Cyprus]" implying, thercfore, the oblitcration of the Turkish right of intcrvention granted to it by thc Zurich-London agrccments of 1960. 37 In the folIowing period cxtending from 1974 to the proclamation of "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in Novembcr 1983, UN Resolutions had "demandfed] thc vvithdravval wilhout further delay of ali foreign armcd forccs.. and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus". 38 As bicommunal talks did not lead to a negotiated settlcment of thc Cyprus problem, -beyond producing a fourth-point agrecmcnt in Fcbruary 1977 and ten-point agrccmcnt in May 1979-, General Assembly Resolutions, beginning with thc onc adoptcd on Novembcr 9, 1978, and Sccurity Council Resolutions up to thc onc (789) adopted on Novembcr 25,1992 tended to intcrnationalize thc Cyprus problem by secmingly broadening thc scopc of negotiations beyond intercommunal talks through attempts to inelude General Assembly, Sccurity Council and Secrctary General of the UN in thc negotiation proccss. 39 They also recognised Grcck Cypriot adıııinistration as thc legilimate govemmeni of Cyprus and callcd on ali statcs to support and help it. In this context, it is truc, Sccurity Council Resolution 649 of March 1990 vvas thc first UN Rcsolulion recognizing -to thc pleasure of thc Turks-thc cxistcncc of tvvo polilically equal communities in Cyprus and thc neccssily of solving Cyprus problem on thc basis of a "bicommunal and bizonal federation". Hovvcvcr, neither this rcsolulion nor thc follovving ones rccognizcd thc right of sclfdetermination of Turkish Cypriots as a separate pcoplc and thc right of separate sovcrcignty for the Turkish Rcpublic of Northern Cyprus vvhich Turkish Cypriots have not abandoncd to this day as the sine qua non of a Federal Solution in Cyprus. 4 Among thc neutrals vverc Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Gambia, Iraq, Kuvvait, Malaysia, Maldivcs, Mauritania, Çalar, Tunisia, United Arab Emiratcs, Indoncsia, Oman, Somalia, Morocco and thc Yemen Arab Rcpublic. These states' ncutral status vvas indicatcd by thcir consistcnt or inconsistcnt -varying from state to state and again depending on particular circumstanccs prevailing al Ihc lime as vvcll as on thcir established positions on Cyprus-abstaining from voting on pro-Grcck Cypriot UN General Assembly resolutions sincc 1960s on. Of these states Saudi Arabia, Iraq -bccamc anli-Turkish on Cyprus issue after ıhc Kuvvait crisis of August 1990 vvhich straincd Iraq's relations vvilh Turkey-Afghanistan and Libya vvere thc notably aetive oncs -even if not consistcntly-in making cfforts lo find a compromisc during thc UN General Assembly deliberalions in thc OIC and Non-Aligncd mcctings on ıhc Cyprus issuc. 44 Among thcsc four Islamic states, Saudi Arabia, a moderate Arab sıaie and onc of thc most influcntial members of thc OIC vvilh iraditionally good relations vvilh Turkey and tlıe Wcst, distinguishcd itseli by its consistcnt aetive nculralily sincc 1960's on. Most particularly during thc hot UN General Assembly debates on Cyprus qucstion in thc 1970s follovving Turkish mililary intervenlion in Cyprus rcprcscnlativcs of Saudi Arabia proposed amcndmcnts to pro-Grcck Cypriot drafl resolutions and prcscnicd drafl resolutions ilsclf that vvould bc acccptablc only by Turkey. 45 For cxamplc, ihis country supportcd thc vvithdravval of ali foreign armcd forccs from thc island only after tvvo communitics rcachcd a ncgotiatcd seltlcmcnt. Similarly shc favorcd inviting Rauf Dcnklaş to thc UN General Assembly in his capacily as "Vicc-Prcsidcnt of Cyprus" to explain his casc there.
The OIC
As for thc rest of thc Islamic countrics, they vvere consistcnt or inconsistcnt -again varying from country to country-supporters of Grcck Cypriot position on thc Cyprus issuc. Among these Egypt, Syria, -thc socallcd "progressive", anti-Wcstcrn and anıi-Turkish Arab states of thc 1950s-, Lebanon -an intcrnally dividcd Arab state-and Palestinc -perhaps thc most adamantly opposcd to Turkey's spccial tics vvith Israel among ali Arab statesconsistcntly perpetuated thcir "opponcnt" -of Turkey's Cyprus causcpositions from 1960s on. A nolablc ehange in this group of states occurcd in thc 1970s vvhen Algcria vvas added to them, having bccn shifted from an "aetive ncutrality" role in the 1960s, a role shc carricd out then vvith Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. 46 In thc period follovving Turkey's 
Disadvantages Of Turkey In Getting Islamic States' Support On its Cyprus Cause:
It appcars ihat Turkcy had considcrablc disadvanlagcs in getting full and consistcnt support of ıhc Islamic countrics on its Cyprus causc from ıhc 1960s on. Onc of thcsc vvas relaled to thc non-aligncd intcrnalional oricntation of ali Islamic countrics. Ali non-aligncd countrics, regardless of thcir diffcrcnccs in thcir forcign policics, country Iocations and thc facl that the end of Cold War and collapsc of thc Sovict Union madc thc lerm "nonaligncd" currcntly irrevelant in vvorld politics, are opposcd to ali pcrccivcd forms of colonialism. Most non-aligncd states had history of domination by somc colonial povvcr and of nalional boundarics having bccn artifically sel by outsiders. Many Non-Aligncd African and Asian nationalisl lcadcrs, Müslim or Non-Muslim, mcliculously refraincd from convcying an impression of cxtcnding any support to former colonial ist states, an acı that vvould bc incompatiblc vvilh thc principlc of nalional self-delermination, indepcndcncc, territorial integrity that they ali upheld. 48 It appcarcd that this sensitivity to colonialism madc ali Islamic Slatcs rcccptivc to ıhc propaganda of ıhc Grcck Cypriols, a comradc in non-aligncd movcmcnt, lo thc effcct that thc Grcck Cypriots vvcrc struggling for indcpcndcncc in accordancc vvith thc principlc of national self-determination and for territorial inicgriiy against ncvv colonialist attempts to subjugatc thcm. According to this argument, 49 Grcck Cypriots were carrying out thcir anti-colonialist strugglc against thc colonial powcr of Britain in thc 1950s, and against Turkey in the 1960s. In thc 1950s Turkish Cypriots -"rcbcls" or "terrorists" in Grcck Cypriot eyes-had sidcd wiıh Britain in opposing thc strugglc for indcpcndcncc by Grcck Cypriots and in the early 1960s thcy wcrc coopcrating with Turkey to dividc thc island. In this cooperation, Turkey's ultimate objcclive vvas to cstablish its ovvn dominance ovcr part of thc island in fulfillmcnt of her ovvn colonialist and expansionist ambitions. Zürich and London agreements and thc Turkish allcgations to thc cffcct that thc sccurity of thc Turkish Cypriot minority vvas at stakc in thc facc of Grcck Cypriots' dcsigns to subjugatc thcm, vvere ali uscd as justifications by thc Turkish Cypriots and thc Ankara govcrnment to achieve thcir ovvn sinister plans. Isracl as thc primary thrcat to thc sccurity of Turkey in particular, and of thc region, in general. 51 Duc to this Turkish attitude, combined with thc cffect of ali thc above-mcntioncd historical-psychological factors, Turkcy's rcquest for Arab states' support on thc Cyprus issuc in mid-I960s scems to have appcarcd as self-secking to thc Arabs, as it probably did to them in 1950s whcn they did not support Turkey on Cyprus issuc in thc UN. At lcast equally important to these considcrations appcars to bc thc rescmblences bctwcen thc respeetive positions of Jcws in Palcstine and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus: Bolh bcing thc late comcrs to thcir respeetive places, as pcrccivcd by the Arab statcs. 52 Aside from thcir common sensitivity to thc issuc of colonialism many Islamic counlrics also had common troublcs wiıh internal disunily as it was thc casc in Cyprus. Similar to the casc in Cyprus they cxpcricnced thc painful proccss of nation building at homc whcrc they have been torn apart by rcligious, tribal and languagc conflicts or various diffcrcnccs. Including among such Islamic Statcs wcrc not only African States -which, apart from thcir similar internal charactcristics, wcrc not locatcd ncar Turkey and did not have much relations wiıh that country-and onc of Turkcy's consislcni Middle Eastcrn opponents; Lcbanon, but also thc Central Asian Turkic statcs of former Sovict Union who also have not rccogni/.cd thc Turkish Rcpublic of Northern Cyprus. 53 To these disadvantagcs, wcrc added Turkey's succcssful military intervention in Cyprus on July 20, 1974 and thc declaration by thc Turkish Cypriots thc "Turkish Federated Slalc of Cyprus" on Fcbruary 13, 1975. No matter how justificd these moves vvere, lcgally and morally, parlicularly from Turkish standpoint, suddcnly Turkish dominance över at lcast part of Cyprus through thc cstablishmcnt of a separate Turkish Cypriot state, in short, a permanent division of thc independent state of Cyprus, appcared as a dislincl possibility as a rcsulL of them. From 1974 on thc Grcck Cypriot representatives of Cyprus and rcprcscniativcs of Grcccc joincd thcir forces in thc Non-Aligncd Confcrcncc and thc UN to play on the sensitivity of ali states-regardless thcir rcligion or intcrnational oricntation-on this possibility, presenting permanent division of Cyprus as a rcality. 54 This Grcck Cypriot propaganda sccmcd to have gaincd eredibility further whcn thc UN which OIC has continuously supportcd through its resolutions. 59 Rcsolulion 649 of March 1990, had bccn acccptcd by thc Grcck Cypriots and won thc praisc of Turkish Cypriot Icadcrship duc to its prcviously-mcntioncd naturc. It appcars that this widc vveleome rcccivcd by Rcsolulion 649 raiscd thc hopes of Islamic states, as wcll as others, ıhal resolution of thc Cyprus issuc vvas ncar. They must have bccn discouragcd, therefore, vvith thc continuing lack of progress in bi-communal lalks over thc insistence of Ihc Turkish Cypriot Icadcrship that Turkish Cypriot state vvas sovcrcign, Turkish Cypriot community constilulcd a pcoplc and cntiılcd to self-determination that could bc cxcrciscd even after thc cstablishmcnt of Fcdcration. Oncc morc the Greck Cypriot countcr-thcsis emphasizing onc sovcrcign state, one pcoplc and onc right of self-determination belonging to pcoplc of Cyprus 61 ' must have appcalcd to them. Not surprisingly ali prcviously mcnıioncd UN Sccurity Council Resolutions follovving Resolution 649 vvere adoptcd unanimously vvith ali participaling Islamic states -among tlıcm bcing neutrals; Morocco and Malaysia-voting in favor.
Fourth, closely related vvith thc llıird factor, thc Turkish Cypriots' continuing to dcclarc Fcdcration as thcir ulıimatc objcctivc vvhilc reserving at thc samc time for themselves separate sovercignty and thc right of nalional self-determination that could bc cxcrciscd even after both of an indccisivcncss at best and of a bad faith at vvorst. On bcing asked vvhy his country did not recognizc thc Turkish Cypriot state despite its cxccllcnt ovcrall relationship vvilh Turkey, thc President of Pakistan Gulan Ishak Khan rcportcdly rcıııarkcd thal even Turkish Cypriots themselves have not madc up thcir mind as lo vvhelher they rcally vvant indcpcndcncc. 61 A final factor could bc that not only Rcpublic of Cyprus, rcprcscnicd by Grcck Cypriots, vvas an ally in nonaligncd movement, bul it vvas also a promising cconomic partner for Islamic staics vvho have flourishing cconomic lics vvilh it. 
Conclusion And Prospects For The Future:
The abovc-mcntioncd remark by ıhc President of Pakistan pointcd lo vvhat appcars to bc thc ulıimatc tragedy of ıhc Turkish Cypriot position on thc Cyprus issuc ihat our analysis implicd from thc beginning: Thc Turkish statesmen in Cyprus dccply suspcctcd ihat Grcck Cypriots had not abandoncd thcir historical aim of dominating them, ultimatcly, Icading to Enosis. Yel, Ihcy cqually dccply fclı ihat they could nol abandon Fcdcralion bccausc of its bcing inıcrnalionally rccognizcd ulıimatc solulion of thc Cyprus issuc, but morc importanlly bccausc of Turkey's possible negative rcaction to such an 59 FBIS, August 7, 1991, pp. 52-3. 60 Sec Hürriyet, March 4, 1990, pp. 3, 14. 61 Ibid., Dcccmbcr 7, 1992, p. 23. 62 Sec, for cxamplc, thc casc of İran in FBIS, Dcccmbcr 3, 1992, pp. 65-6.
